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Settlements and Waivers Affectine 
Pension Benefits Under ERISA 
Eric D. Chason 
Waivers affecting pension benefits may be entered into as part of 
a controversy (for example, a settlement agreement) or in isola-
tion (for example, a disclaimer). Under current law, bowever, it is 
unclear bow tbese waivers fit witbin tbe protections of ERISA, 
particularly tbe antialienation rule. Courts have generally bon-
ored settlement agreements so long as tbey are procedurally fair to 
participants. However, the antialienation rule looms in the back-
ground. The IRS and TreasUf)J, in contrast, have focused on 
waivers outside tbe settlement context, prohibiting participants 
from making tbem but allowing benefiCiaries to do so if the waiver 
satisfies gift-tax rules for disclaimers. The author critiques tbese 
results and suggests that waivers that settle disputes or that Simply 
refuse plan benefits moe outside tbe scope of tbe antialienation rule 
and sbould be respected 
Agreements that purport to waive or settle claims under ERISA . raise unique issues, especially for tax-qualified retirement plans. 
A primary issue here is the antialienation rule of ERISA. In essence, 
the antialienation rule says that retirement benefits can neither be 
sold nor made available to creditors of the employee (subject to 
some exceptions). Potentially, then, a private settlement of pension 
rig'lts could never be enforceable against the employee. For ex-
ample, suppose Employer A and Employee B disagree over Em-
ployee B's pension benefit, with A saying it is ~1,200 per month and 
B saying it is $800. To avoid litigation, they settle, agreeing that B 
should receive 51,000 per month. Does this agreement prevent B 
from suing A's plan for 51,200 a month? Employee B might say that 
he or she was really entitled to 51,200 under As plan and that the 
setdement agreement is void as a prohibited alienation. 
Courts have generally avoided this issue and accepted settlement 
agreements affecting pension benefits with some reservations. Some 
courts have suggested that it would matter whether B was "entitled" 
to $1,200 or whether B was simply "claiming" Sl,200. What is meant 
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by this distinction is unclear. Other courts vie\\~ settlements as being 
subject to the antialienation rule while others suggest that settlements 
are entirely outside the scope of the antialienation rule. 
In contrast, the Internal Re\~enue Selyice and Department of Trea-
sury ha\-e focused on \yaivers in isolation, analyzing them under the 
antialienation rule, but also the anticutback rule of LRC Section 
411(d)(6) and ERISA Section 204(g) and the vesting rules of LRC Sec-
tion 411(a) and ERISA Section 203(a). In generaL the agencies have 
found that beneficiaries can v,caive pension benefits but participants 
cannot. The legal basis for this result, and ti~e policy for the distinction 
bem-een participant and beneficiary, are both problematic. 
The focus of this article will be on waivers and settlements be-
tween the employer (or plan), the participant, and any beneficiary 
affecting pre,-iously earned benefits under a pension plan. This ar-
ticle will not focus on waivers affecting participation (that is, 
preaccrual) or wai,'ers affecting welfare plans. First. there will be a 
brief review of the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions. 
Second, there will be a discussion of the case law on waivers. which 
typically deal with settlement agreements. Third, there will be a dis-
cussion of disclaimers, a creation of the law of trusts and estates and 
recognized by the IRS in informal guidance. Finally, there will be a 
discussion of all these authorities with the goal of discussing incon-
sistencies and proposing a general theory of waivers and settlements 
affecting pension rights under ERISA. 
STATUTORY A.l'JD REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
Below is a brief discussion of four major ERISA protections im-
plicated by \';aivers and settlements. They are d1e antialienation rule 
of ERISA Section 206(d)(1) and LR.C. Section 40 1 (a)(13)(A): the writ-
ten plan document rule of ERISA Section 402(a)(1): the anticutback rule 
of ERISA Section 204(g) and I.R.c. Section 411(d)(6); and the non-
fotfeitability rule of ERISA Section 203(a) and I.RC Section 411 (a). 
Antialienation Rule 
The antialienation rule is the focus of many decisions dealing 
\\'ith \\~ai\-ers and settlements. The antialienation rule says dut ben-
efits under a pension plan "may not be assigned or alienated." 
(ERISA §206(d)(1): I.R.c. 401(a)(13)(A).) Treasury regulations indi-
cate that assignments and alienations include arrangements for pay-
ment of plan benefits to the employer and third parties. CTreas. Reg. 
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§1.401(a)-13(c)(1).) The purpose of the antialienation rule is to pre-
vent participants from spending funds that were set aside for retire-
ment. I The antialienation mle does not apply to welfare benefits.2 It 
does, however, apply both to participants and to beneficiaries under 
Treas. Reg. Section 1. 401 (a)-l 3(c)(1)(ii). 
Written Plan Document Rule 
ERISA Section 402(a)(l) says that all ERISA plans must "be estab-
lished and maintained pursuant to a written instrument." This rule 
acts like a Statute of Frauds, protecting participants from secret 
amendments.3 Ko court analyzing ERISA waivers or settlements has 
ever treated them as part of the written plan document (for example, 
as an amendment to the plan). In addition. no court has ever sug-
gested that plans may not follow waivers and settlements on the 
grounds that they are not part of the written plan document. In other 
words, ERISA waivers and settlements can be valid even though they 
are not part of the written plan document. This may seem like a small 
point, but it has important implications for the treatment of waivers 
and settlements under the anticutback rule. 
Anticutback Rule 
Certain rights and benefits under a pension plan may not be 
elininated or reduced by plan amendment. These rights are (1) the 
accrued benefit under the plan, (2) early retirement benefits and re-
tirement-type subsidies (as defined in Treasury regulations), and 
(3) optional fOlllS of benefit under the plan. (ERISA 204(g); 
I.R.c. §411(d)(6).) 
The Treasury regulations state, "In general ... a participant may 
not elect to waive section 411(d)(6) protected benefits." (Treas. Reg. 
§411Cd)-4 Q&A 3(a)(3).) By 411(d)(6) protected benefits, the regula-
tions refer to the three types of benefits described in the preceding 
paragraph.4 There are ~~o exceptions to this rule in the regulations 
dealing with transfers between plans, which have been expanded by 
the recent tax act (EGTRR.!\).5 The regulation quoted above could be 
interpreted as prohibiting any vvaiver, or even a settlement of pen-
sion claims, by a participant. (It is worth noting that the terms of the 
regulation do not apply to a beneficiary.) The IRS has reiterated its 
position on participant waivers in its manual and in a private ruling. 6 
If this regulation were valid, it might well end, or at least great-
ly shorten, the discussion of waivers relating to pension plans. 
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Howeyer, this regulation probably is invalid. It is black-letter law that 
the anticutback rule applies only to plan amendments. One circuit 
court has said, "[T]he \vord amendment is used as a word of limita-
tion . . . Congress did not state that any change would trigger [the 
anticutback rule]; it stated that any change by amendment would do 
so ... In its present form, [the anticutback rule] is specifically limited 
to actual amendments."-
By prohibiting "'.'aivers (which are not amendments) under au-
thority of the anticutback rule (\vhich applies only to amendments), 
the regulation is invalid even under the deferential standard of 
"manifestly contrary to the statute."8 This standard, however, applies 
only to legislative regulations, which are issued under express grants 
of regulatory authority.9 There is no general authority to issue legisla-
ti\Ce regulations under LRC Section 411(d)(6) and ERISA Section 
204(g). As a result, the waiver regulations under I.RC Section 
411(d)(6) are probably interpretive regulations and subject to an 
even less deferential standard of review, meaning they are upheld 
only if they implement the statute in a reasonable manner. IO 
Nonf01feitability Rule 
A participant's benefit must be nonforfeitable (vested) upon satis-
fying certain service requirements under ERISA and the Code. (I.RC 
§411(a); ERISA §203(a).) The purpose of this rule is to prevent em-
ployers from forfeiting penSion benefits in response to termination of 
employment or misconduct by the employeeY In its manual and in a 
private ruling, the IRS has indicated that 'waivers implicate the 
nonforfeitability rules. 12 
WAIVERS AND SETTLEMENTS UNDER THE CASE LAW 
As discussed in this section, courts have honored settlements and 
waivers subject to limitations.13 However, the limitations vary from 
decision to decision. Although there is no recognized split of author-
ity, the cases might be broadly divided between tv.-o lines. One line 
views the \-alidity of wai\-ers and settlements as essentially beyond 
the scope of the antialienation rule, considering them valid if they 
are "knowing and ·voluntary.·· Essentially, these courts ,-iew the valid-
ity of waivers and settlements as depending upon the procedure un-
der which they were executed. Another line views the validity of 
waivers and settlements as being subject to the antialienation rule, 
considering them valid if thev do not result in the alienation of 
VOL 14, No.4, WINTER 2001 64 BENEFITS LAW JOURNAL 
Settlements and Waivers Affedin~ Pension Benefits Under ERISA 
"established" pension rights. This division may not neatly apply to 
every decision, although it does represent the two main doctrines 
that courts apply \v~hen aralyzing waivers and settlements. 
Waivers and Settlements Under the 
"Knowing and Voluntary" Standard 
Courts using the knowing and voluntary standard generally agree 
that waivers of pension rights are subject to high scrutiny.14 They also 
generally agree that enforceability of waivers is governed by federal 
common law.15 The essence of the inquiry for these courts is whether 
the waiver or settlement was "knowing and voluntary" under all of 
the facts and circumstances.16 
COutts have developed a list of factors for assistance in determin-
ing whether waivers and settlements are knowing and voluntary. The 
first court to do so was the Second Circuit in Laniok v. Advisory Com-
mittee of Brainerd lVlanujacturing. Company Pension Plan, 935 F.2d 
1360 (2d Cir. 1991), which borrowed the following list of factors from 
ADEA waiver cases-
• employee's education and business experience; 
• amount of time the employee had to review the agreement 
before signing; 
• employee's role in deciding terms of the agreement; 
• clarity of the agreement; 
• whether the employee had legal representation and 
whether the employer encouraged the employee to seek it; 
and 
• whether the consider~tion given in exchange for the 
waiver exceeded the employee benefits that the employee 
was already entitlec to. 
The court in Laniok insisted that the list of factors was simply a 
guide, and not a checklist. The court said, "The essential question is 
a pragmatic one: whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the 
individual's waiver of his right can be characterized as 'knowing and 
voluntary."'17 The First Circuit has applied these factors in a some-
what more mechanical manner in lVlorais v. Central Beverage COtp. 
UnIOn Employees' Supplemental Retirement Plan, 167 F.3d 709 (1st 
Cir. 1999). In lVlorais, the court found that the language of the waiver 
agreement can support factors 2 (time to review agreement) and 5 
(legal representation). 18 In fact, the court held that plaintiff's extrinsic 
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evidence was inadmissible to establish that these factors were not 
satisfied. '9 
The decision in Laniok did not implicate the antialienation rule 
or the anticutback rule, because it dealt ''.'ith an employee's waiver of 
participation in a pension plan upon first being hired. (That is to say, 
the employee had nothing to be alienated or cut back at the time.) 
However, other courts have approved waivers and settlements under 
the Laniok test in 'ways that do implicate the antialienation rule. For 
example, the Second Circuit in Finz u'. Schlesinger, 957 F.2d 78 (2d 
Cir.), ceniorari denied, 506 C.S. 822 (1992), respected a waiver of 
pension benefits by an attorney (Finz). Finz was apparently a share-
holder in the firm and claimed he joined the firm in hopes of receiv-
ing a "guaranteed pension." Seven years after joining the firm, Finz 
demanded information on the pension, which the firm refused to 
provide. Finz and the firm settled the dispute by an agreement where 
Finz relinquished all rights he may have had to the pension plan. 
\"X'ithout even addressing the issue of antialienation,2D the Finz court 
seemed content that the severance agreement satisfied the standard 
set fonh by Laniok. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit separated the en-
forceability of settlements from the operation of the antialienation 
rule by saying, "[T)he anti-alienation provision protects individuals 
who pledge their pension benefits as collateral or squander their 
benefits before retirement. .. The Settlement Agreement in this 
case does not fall into either category. "21 
Rhoades v. Cas~v, 196 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1999), certiorari denied, 531 
u.s. 924 (2000), is perhaps the clearest case of waiving uncontested 
pension entitlements. There. the Fift..~ Circuit respected a bank 
executive's waiver of his ESOP benefits. The executive waived the ben-
efit as part of settling an investigation by the Office of Thrift Supervision 
and the Texas Savings and Loan Department on the grounds that the 
executive may have "committed violations of banking regulations, 
breached fiduciary duties, and engaged in unsafe or unsound banking 
practices."22 Later, the executive claimed the \\-'aiver was invalid under 
the antialienation mle. Citi..'1g Finz, the court noted, "[11he anti-alien-
ation provision of ERISA is not absolute. Courts . . . have noted that 
there is an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision for a knowing 
and voluntary waiver of retirement benefits that is executed to reach a 
settlement. "23 The court also suggested that all "voluntary waivers of 
pension benefits by a plan participant that are made in exchange for 
substantial consideration" are exempt.24 
\'Vhat seems to unite this line of cases is that panicipants can 
execute waivers affecting pension rights as long as the waiver is 
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knowing and voluntaly. The cases dealing with waivers after the 
benefits have (allegedly) accrued might also be read as to require 
that the waiver be executed as part of the settlement of a dispute. 
That said, the settlement-of-a-dispute element was only tangentially 
related to the waiver in Rhoades. There, the participant's dispute was 
with bank regulators, not ~with the plan or his employer. 
Wa:ivers and Settlements Under the Antialienation Rule 
Other cases have focused more sharply on the antialienation rule 
in analyzing waivers and settlements. In the view of these courts, a 
waiver of pension rights cannot violate the antialienation rule, even if 
the waiver satisfies the test in Laniok. Taken to an extreme, however, 
this view could invalidate many settlements affecting pension ben-
efits. }...rnbiguities in plan :erms, the law, and the facts can all cause 
wide differences in how much benefits a participant is entitled to. If 
plan and participant resolve these ambiguities through a settlement, 
it is unclear what would keep a participant from bringing the 
"se:tled" issues before a court, claiming that the settlement was really 
an impermissible alienation. 
To prevent this problem, some cases have suggested distinctions 
between permissibly settling pension disputes and impermissibly 
alienating penSion benefits. For the Seventh Circuit in Licciardi u. 
Kropp Forge Divisian Employees' Retire'ment Plan, 990 F.2d 979 (7th 
Cir. 1993), Judge Richard Posner wrote: 
The basic point is that the release released the defendants from 
liability based on contestable pension claims .... [T]he release did not 
,vipe out Licciardi's claims to any pension benefits to which the plan 
entitled him. If the release were thought broad enough to wipe out 
actual pension entitlements, its enforceability would be questionable 
in light of ERISA's provision forbidding the alienation of pension 
benefits. For then it might be a case of Licciardi's having "sold" his 
pension tights, in the rele~cse, in exchange for the 5650,000 and any 
other considerati.on in the omnibus agreement. 25 
This passage seems to divide issues between those related to "pen-
sion entitlements" and "con:estable pension claims." In a subsequent 
case, Lynn v. CSX Transporation, 84 F.3d 970, 975 Oth Cir. 1996), the 
Se\'enth Circuit tried to make this distinction more clear: 
Pension entitlements are, without exception, subject to the anti-
alienation provision of ERISA. Contested pension claims, on the other 
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hand, are "simply outside the realm of the provision." The distinction 
between these two categories is a critical one, and, if the decision of 
the district court is any indication, one that has not yet been drawn 
with sufficient clarity. A pension entitlement arises under the terms 
of the pension plan itself. A contested pension claim, by contrast, 
arises under a settlement agreement. A release may prevent a plan 
participant from asserting claims based on a settlement agreement, 
but may not bar claims based on pension entitlements. 26 
In Lynn, the plaintiff had signed a general release upon terminat-
ing employment. He later sued the pension plan of his employer 
claiming, among other things, that he should receive credit under the 
plan for his military service. The Seventh Circuit held that this claim 
was not waived under the general release. The court's rationale was 
that the claim v,'as not based upon the release but was based upon 
pension entitlements that vvere outside the realm of the release.T 
This can be contrasted with LiCCiardi, where the plaintiff asked that 
amounts received under a settlement agreement count towards cred-
ited earnings under the pension plan. The claim in Licciardi was 
barred because it arose under the agreement which contained a gen-
eral release and did not designate the earnings as counting towards 
the plaintiffs pension. As a result, the court viewed the claim as be-
ing waived. 28 
The Tax Coun has expressly ruled that the 'waiver of an accrued 
benefit under a pension plan violates the antialienation rule, even if 
the waiver was knowing and voluntary. In Gallade v. Commissioner, 
106 T.c. 355(996), the taxpayer owned a company 100 percent and 
wanted to have his substantial benefits revert to the company v"hen 
he terminated the company's pension plan. The Tax Court disre-
garded the waiver as violating the antialienation rule, and ruled that 
the taxpayer received a deemed distribution from the plan. The 
wah'er was not (as other reported cases), part of settling any case or 
controversy. Instead, the taxpayer \\'anted his pension to revert to his 
company in order to provide funding for the company. A curious 
aspect is that Gallade was not dealing with protecting a participant 
from squandering his or her pension benefits, which is the purpose 
of the antialienation rule. 29 
Gallade did not even technically deal with the tax-qualified sta-
tus of the plan. Instead. it dealt with the tax consequences of the 
waiver, and found that the waiving partiCipant was in constructive 
receipt of the benefit. The analysis of the Tax Court was essentially 
this: (1) the waiver violated the antialienation rule, and (2) therefore 
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the taxpayer is taxed under the constructive receipt doctrine. How-
ever, the Tax Court never said why (1) leads to (2). Perhaps the 
theory was not really invaLd but was rather disregarded for tax pur-
poses. To reconcile the tax treatment (the waiver is disregarded) with 
the substantive reality (the corporation, not the taxpayer, has the 
money), the Tax Court may have implicitly "expanded" the transac-
tion by deeming the occunence of two steps-taxpayer receives dis-
tribution and then contributes it to company. However, this analysis 
was altogether unnecessary. This is because the taxpayer's waiver 
could have simply been treated as an assignment, and thus a distri-
bution, under 1.R.c. Sectio::) 72(p)(l)(B). As a result, the whole dis-
cussion of the validity of waivers in Gallade could be viewed as 
obzter dicturn. 
DISCLljMERS 
A disclaimer is typically thought of as the refusal of a gift or be-
quest by a beneficiary. Usually, the beneficiary refuses the gift or 
bequest, which then passes as if the beneficiary had predeceased the 
donor. If the disclaimer meets the requirements of LR.C. Section 
2518, then the beneficiary is not subject to gift tax, even though the 
beneficiary could have received the property but instead let it pass to 
someone else (presumably a person the beneficiary wishes to ben-
efit). It is important to note, however, that disclaimers are not created 
by federal law. For the property interest to bypass the beneficiary, 
there must be a provision in applicable state law. That said, such 
provisions are relatively unifo:TIl across the laws of the various 
stares.30 
In G.C.M. 39858 (September 23, 1991), the IRS concluded that a 
disclaimer by a beneficiary· does not violate the antialienation rule if 
(1) the disclaimer meets the requirements of LR.C. Section 2518 and 
(2) the disclaimer meets t~1e requirements of "applicable state law." 
In addition, the disclaimer would not result in immediate income 
taxation. There was no discussion as to why disclaimers are an ex-
ception to LR.C. Section 72(p)(1)(B). 
Typically, a disclaimer would meet these requirements if within 
nine months of the participant's death the beneficiary delivered a 
written refusal of benefits to the plan administrator and personal rep-
resentative of the deceased participant without previously taking a 
distribution. In addition, the disclaimant must not have received any 
consideration for making the disclaimer. The IRS gave no opinion 
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on disclaimers that fail to meet this standard. There are no cases or regu-
lations dealing with disclaimers of benefits under a ta.x-qualified plan. 
The IRS did nm say hmv the state law of disclaimers could be ap-
plicable to tax-qualified retirement plans in light of ERISA preemp-
tion. The Supreme Court has recently ruled twice that aspects of state 
probate hw are preempted by ERISAY Presumably, the preempted 
state law of disclaimers could be replaced by plan language allowing 
for disclaimers, or a court might recognize some federal common law 
of disclaimers that applies to ERISA plans. 
Plan language (or federal common 1a\\') would not necessarily 
a,,~oid the problem of disclaimers under the antialienation rule. The 
,,~hole of the analysis in G.C.;'vL 39858 is the assertion that the rules 
governing disclaimers "are generally consistent with the Congres-
sional purpose underlying" the antialienation rule. A disclaimer, 
howeyer, can be a complete v,~aiver of all benefits that a beneficiary 
has under the plan. It is unclear \vhy the IRS belieyes this is consis-
tent \\'ith the antialienation rule but thinks that a complete \vaiyer of 
all benefits by a participant is not. 
The G.c.;,vI. is probably sufficient to ease concerns oyer disquali-
fying a plan by honoring disclaimers. Disclaimers are acknowledged 
in proposed regulations under an unrelated Code section, LR.C. Sec-
tion 401(a)(9). (Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-4 Q&A 4.) So, the IRS 
has allowed disclaimers but only in a \~ery informal fashion. 
Cntil there is more substantial authority on the subject, however, 
cautious fiduciaries might choose nor to accept disclaimers out of 
concern oyer liability under Title I of ERISA. Kot only is there risk of 
liability to the disclaiming beneficiary, but there might also be liabil-
ity to his or her heirs. For example, suppose a participant names her 
second husband as primary beneficiary and her child from a prior 
marriage as secondary beneficiary under a 401(k) plan. Palticipam 
dies, and second husband disclaims. allowing the account balance to 
pass to the child from the prior marriage. The second husband may 
have a claim (although unsympathetic) that his disclaimer violated 
the antialienation rule. If second husband dies \\'ith surviving chil-
dren from another marriage. ho~ve\'er, these children might have a 
more sympathetic claim that the disclaimer is invalid. 
The more curious aspect is the fact that the IRS thinks that a 
benefiCiary's '·qualified disclaimer·· satisfying "applicable state la,,/' 
(if there is such a thing) satisfies antialienation, amicutback, and 
nonforfeitability requirements. On the other hand, the IRS thinks a 
palticipant's refusal to receive benefits under a plan violates all of 
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these requirements. However, the technical operation of disclaimer 
rules could be used to allow a pm1icipant, and not just a beneficiary, 
to disclaim an imerest in a pension plan before payments com-
mence. Under the gift tax rules relied on in the G.C.M. 39858, a 
disclaimant has nine months after the date of "the transfer creating 
the interest in the disclaimant,'32 provided that the disclaimant has 
not previously enjoyed the benefits of the property (for example, re-
ceil/ed a distribution). The date of the transfer occurs when the trans-
fer is complete for federal gift tax purposes. A transfer to a defined 
benefit plan would rarely be considered "complete" under the gift 
tax rules because the employer typically has the power to add new 
participants.33 (The transfer may be considered complete to a defined 
contribution plan because new participants could not receive ben-
efits from a particular account of a vested participant.) So, at least in 
the case of defined benefit plans, a literal application of the dis-
claimer rules could allow a participant to disclaim an accrued benefit 
up to the time tha': benefit payments commence. 
A MORE GENERAL THEORY OF W ANERS AND 
SETTLEMENTS OF PENSION CLAIMS UNDER ERISA 
Cunent law places plans and participants in a difficult position 
because it is unclear wha': pension claims can be waived. Case law 
has generally dealt with waivers under settlement agreements, focus-
ing on procedural protections and contract interpretation. The best 
summary of case law I can provide is that waivers under settlement 
agreements are usually respected subject to interpretation of the 
agreement and procedural safeguards for participants. However, the 
antialienation rule unnecessarily stilts the analysis of the courts. 
The IRS and Treasury have dealt with isolated waivers of ben-
efits. They think that waivers by participants are per se impermis-
sible. The only regulation on this was issued under LR.C. Section 
411 (d)(6) , which deals oliy with plan amendments. Beneficiaries, 
however, can waive death benefits if they do so within nine months 
of:he participant's death and do not receive a distribution before 
executing the disclaimer, 
What Should Be Waivable in the Settlement Context 
As noted previously, there are tvvo cunents of cases dealing with 
settlement agreements: 
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• Some courts (for example, the Seventh Circuit) think there 
is a distinction bet\\'een unwaivable "pension entitlements" 
and waiFable "contested pension claims." I will call this the 
"Contested Claim Position." 
• Some courts (for example, the Second and Fifth Circuits) 
think that any pension benefit can be subject to a "knowing 
and voluntary 'Yai,'er" if part of settling a dispute. I will call 
this the "Knowing and Voluntary Position." 
In this section, I will try to show that the K..f}o"~ing and Voluntary 
Position is the better method for analyzing waivers and settlements 
arising out of pension disputes. 
The primary problem '1.'ith the Contested Claim Position is the 
difficult distinction it makes bet,,~een pension entitlements and con-
tested pension claims. It should be noted that the courts making this 
distinction (Licciardi and Lynn) did not really apply them to the facts 
at hand. Rather, both courts simply said that a settlement agreement 
would not create any additional pension benefits by reason of settle-
ment payments unless specified by the agreement. This is a simple 
enough rule, seemingly based more on interpreting the settlement 
agreement than on applying the antialienation rule. In addition, 
these courts maintained that pension claims independent of the 
settlement agreement were not waived. Again, this is mere contract 
interpretation. (It might also be a good reason for employers to 
staple a benefit statement to settlement agreements they reach with 
employees before execution.) 
Even though Licciardi and L)'1111 can be explained as simple 
cases of contract interpretation, the decisions are written in terms of 
the antialienation rule. "l;nfonunately, these decisions never really 
differentiate between wah'able pension claims and unwaivable pen-
sion entitlements. The decisions seem to imply that if the issue is a 
subject of the controyersy, it is a pension claim. \y'hile this might lead 
to the result I ultimately argue for below, it does not make much 
sense. Since virtually anything could be the subject of a controversy, 
then virtually anything could be a v.~aivable pension claim. 
\\:'hat these courts might be trying to say is parties usually have 
controversies O\'er "ambiguous" (vvhich they consider waivable) 
claims rather than "clear-cut" entitlements (which they consider 
unwai\'able). This analysis has problems of its own. Typically, a pen-
sion plan giye the administrator the power to resolve ambiguities, 
and the exercise of this power is respected by courts unless it is 
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arbitrary' and capricious.34 This analysis would lead to the conclusion 
that settlement agreements can function only as to matters subject to 
fiduciarv discretion. In one sense. a settlement would not be a 
, ' 
waiver on the merits of the claim, but rather a waiver that the fidu-
ciary was arbitrary and capricious over the final determination. As a 
result, a plan could settle only those pension claims that a respon-
sible fiduciary could determine on his or her own. 
These problems point toward adopting the Knowing and Volun-
tar{ Position. The primary advantage of this position is that it relieves 
courts of having to make the problematic distinction between "pen-
sion entitlements" and "contested pension claims." Whether some-
thing is a "pension entitlement" depends on numerous facts, 
interpretations of ambiguous or missing facts, legal rules, and inter-
pretations of complex or ambiguous rules. For example, new cases, 
sta~utes, or regulations may shed light on prior ambiguities, turning 
what were previously ambiguous matters under a settlement into 
clear-cut pension entitlements. Essentially, settlement agreements 
could bring a final and binding resolution only to factual disputes 
(and then only if new clarifying facts were not brought to light). 
Under the Knowing and Voluntary Position, a court reviewing a 
settlement agreement would (1) determine whether the terms of the 
settlement agreement cover the issue at hand and (2) determine 
whether the settlement agreement was a knowing and voluntary act 
by the participant. It would not need to determine the state of the 
facts and law at the time of the settlement or at the time of decision 
in order to find out whether the matter was a pension entitlement 
and not subject to settlement. 
One potential criticism is that an employer could extort a settle-
ment agreement from a participant by acting in bad faiL1}. However, 
the cases adopting the knowing and voluntary test do not automati-
cally approve all settlements. Rather, they require that a settlement 
agreement be a knowing and voluntary act on the part of the partici-
pant. For example, if an employer would not pay benefits to a par-
ticipant until the participant agreed to a benefit reduction under a 
waiver, a court should have no problem looking at those facts and 
determining the waiver was not knowing and voluntary. In fact, the 
Knowing and Voluntary Position would allow courts to look at nu-
merous factors, including the ones set forth in Laniok. Because of the 
ability to settle more issue (legal and factual) and because of the in-
herent procedural safeguards, the Knowing and Voluntary Position 
should be the one adopted by the courts. 
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W'hat Should Be Waivable Outside the Settlement Context 
The rules on \yai\~ers outside the settlement context can be sum-
marized as follows: 
• The Tax Court thinks that a \yai\~er of benefits violates the 
antialienation rule. 
• The IRS and Treasury think that a ~waiver of any fIght 
coyered by I.R. C. Section 411 (d)( 6) by a participant violates 
the antialienation, anticutback, and nonforfeitability rules. 
• The IRS thinks that a waiver of benefits by a beneficiary is 
permissible, so long as it satisfies the gift-tax mles under 
I.R.c. Section 2518. 
\Vai\~ers of benefits by participants outside of settlements are appar-
entlv more limited under current rules. \\'~aivers bv beneficiaries are , . 
more liberal so long as they comply \viln the gift-tax rules. 
Neither the courts nor the IRS has e\'er addressed disclaimers 
by participants in the context of the gift-tax rules. As discussed 
above, the gift -tax rules could allow for a disclaimer by a participant. 
at least in most defined benefit plans. Fitting along with the 
antialienation rule, the disclaimer mles prohibit a disclaimant from 
recei\'ing consideration in exchange for making the disclaimer. In 
other words, a participant could not sell pension benefits under the 
guise of a disclaimer. As noted in G.C.:\L 39858, trust beneficiaries at 
common law ",'ere under no obligation to accept trust benefits. Par-
ticipants should nor be under this obligation as well, if they choose 
to refuse benefits, 
The disclaimer rules seem to provide a method for palticipants to 
decline receipt of plan benefits without implicating the antialienation 
rule. Because the disclaimer rules participants could not recei\~e con-
sideration in exchange for their disclaimers, Applying the gift-tax 
rules for disclaimers would lead Ie the same result as in Gallade, 
where the Tax Court disregarded a \'aiver of pension benefits by the 
100 percent owner of a company. In that case, the owner did not 
truly waive his benefits, but instead let them pass to his corporation 
(presumably for income-tax reasons). Essentially, the owner ac-
cepted Ll}e benefits, which is inconsistent with the gift-tax rules. Con-
\'ersely, the result in Rhoades is consistent with this result. There, a 
bank executiye waived his entire benefit, retaining no direct or indi-
rect interest. The Fhfth Circuit approved this wai\~er (although justify-
ing it as a settlement with bank regulators). 
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The gift -ta,x model also recognizes the distinction betvveen a refusal 
to receive benefits and an alienation or assignment of benefits. A refusal 
of trust benefits is allowed under the law of truSTS, as noted by the 
G.C.M. If this right to refuse is granted to beneficiaries, and there is no 
reason why palticipants should not have it as well. The use of disclaim-
ers by participants may well be inconsistent with current IRS position 
ani Treasury regulations, although this is not completely clear. 
As noted above, however, the Treasury regulations prohibiting 
w~jvers are probably invaJid because they were issued under I.R.C. 
Section 411 (d)(6) , which applies only to plan amendments. Even if 
the gift-tax model for disclaimers is not recognized, there should be 
no bar to waivers of pension rights not covered by the antialienation 
rule (for example, optional forms of benefit). 
CONCLUSION 
With increasing litigation and complexity surrounding pension 
issues, plans and their palticipants will increasingly settle their dis-
putes by private agreement. Unfortunately, the current case law is 
somewhat unclear on wt.at issues can be settled in light of the 
an:ialienation rule, with some courts drawing a difficult distinction 
be:ween waivable pension claims and unwaivable pension entitle-
ments. Other courts view pension settlements as being outside the 
re~Jm of the antialienation ::ule, and will respect settlement so long as 
it is a knowing and voluntary act on the part of the participant. This 
seems to be the better view, as it protects the interests of participants 
wUle allowing parties to settle without the prospect of it being sub-
ject to collateral attack under the antialienation rule. 
\Vaiving pension rights outside the settlement conteJ<..'t is more 
problematic, with the IRS and Treasmy drawing a sharp distinction 
between waivers by participants and by their beneficiaries. On the 
one hand, the IRS and Treasury have stretched 1.R.c. Section 
4L(d)(6) to the breaking point, using it to prohibit waivers by par-
ticipants even tho'Jgh the statute applies only to plan amendments. 
On the other hand, the IRS has (in a General Counsel Memorandum) 
recognized gift-tax disclaimers by beneficiaries as being pelmissible. 
The problem with the first view is that the regulation is invalid under 
the statute. The problem with the second view is that the General 
Counsel Memorandum may be insufficient guidance for fiduciaries to 
rely on. 
The best solution would be to allow beneficiaries and partici-
pants to waive pension benefits so long as the waivers satisfy the 
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gift-tax rules for disclaimers. This solution would be consistent \vith 
the case law of ERISA waivers and with the la"w of trusts, allmdng 
participants and beneficiaries to refuse pension benefits if they so 
choose. This solution may need regulation or statute to be imple-
mented. Fiduciaries acting in the ordinary course may then wish to 
refuse to recognize disclaimers by participants and beneficiaries out 
of concern for potential liability under the currently unsettled rules. 
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